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Sticks, Carrots and all the Rest:
Lombardy and the Spanish strategy
in Northern Italy between Europe
and the Mediterranean (part. 2)
Mario Rizzo
Consensus and resources: the co-optation of Italian princes and magnates
1 In analysing the many elements of Spanish strategy in Italy, special attention must be
paid to the co-optation of the élites, whether of the indigenous baronial or aristocratic
classes of the Habsburg territories or of their peers in the independent Italian states. This
was a cornerstone of the Grand Strategy of the Spanish Habsburg composite monarchy,
which had to rely heavily on a multi-tiered system of patronage.1 The granting of business
opportunities, offices, executive posts, honorific titles and dignities, pensions, gifts, and
other  mercedes  (rewards)  to  members  of  these élites  fostered political  consensus and
broadened support for Spanish strategic interests. Those who received this patronage in
most cases shared interests, attitudes, and values with their benefactors.2 Spanish power
depended upon a sense of inclusiveness, as the political history of Genoa in the 1570s
(examined above) demonstrates. Significantly, mercedes were granted even to people of
middling social rank.3 In Lombardy appointments for two-year offices, that is, positions
that were considered relatively less important and prestigious, were usually granted to
minor figures. Far from neglecting these apparently petty issues, in 1592 Philip II wrote to
his governor in Milan, ordering him to appoint ‘learned, virtuous, experienced, and upright
people’, but at the same time urging him to choose ‘subjects of mine and mostly … Lombards,
so that they be rewarded for their staunchness and devotion’.4
2 At  a  higher  level,  soft  power  proved to  be  a  valuable  tool  to  form or  reinforce  the
attachment to Madrid in a number of ways: for instance, Giannettino Doria, one of Gian
Andrea Doria’s sons, studied at the very prestigious University of Salamanca, the heart of
Castilian culture and tradition.5 Big carrots (in the shape of arranged marriages, honours,
offices, pensions, commands, and so forth) were offered to high-ranking and influential
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figures, of whom there were a disproportionately large number in northern Italy – rulers
of  small  states,  feudal  lords,  members  of  rich  and  powerful  families,  local  notables,
clergymen, officials,  or courtly dignitaries.6 In this way, regional and local élites were
bound to the Spanish Monarchy. A few outstanding Genoese cases have been mentioned
already. By way of example, amongst Lombards it is worth mentioning Paolo Sfondrati,7
Sforza Moroni,8 Camillo Castiglioni,9 Alfonso della Somaglia, 10 Marco Antonio Simonetta, 11
Gio. Giacomo Belgioioso,12 Renato Borromeo.13 Other subjects of the State of Milan, such as
Gabrio Serbelloni,  Ambrogio Landriano, Bernabò Barbo, Edoardo Lanzavecchia, will  be
mentioned in the following pages on account of their outstanding military skills. But we
should  not  overlook  military  and  political  figures  such as  Giovanni  Anguissola  from
Piacenza  or  Pirro  Malvezzi  from  Bologna,  which  was  also  the  home  town  of  the
Bentivoglios, a couple of whom also served Philip II.14 
3 In Savoy, for instance, Philip could count on Andrea Provana di Leinì, Filippo d’Este, Carlo
Pallavicino, and other counsellors of Charles EmanuelI,15 as well as the president of the
senate  Lazzaro  Baratta  and  the  first  secretary  of  state  Agostino  Ripa.16 Vespasiano
Gonzaga,  Duke  of  Sabbioneta,  is  another  outstanding  case:  he  enjoyed  prestigious
commands and later on was successively appointed viceroy of Navarre,  Valencia,  and
Naples.17 Not surprisingly, a similar effort to recruit and engage influential figures in Italy
was also made by the French Monarchy.18
4 At the top level, this approach implied the co-optation of major sovereign princes (like
those of Savoy, Florence, Parma, or Ferrara) and their relatives, by appointing them to
prestigious executive posts,19 granting military commands, 20 conceding honours, 21 paying
pensions,22 making  presents, 23 arranging  marriages,24 transferring  land,25 sometimes
interfering in and taking advantage of family dissensions,26 or admitting at court a heir
apparent in order to give him a cultural,  political,  and military education suitable to
Spanish interests27 – a peculiar practice of soft power.
5 The young Alessandro Farnese presents a perspicuous example of this use of soft power,
one which sheds light on the changing relationship between the Spanish Habsburgs and
the dukes of Parma and Piacenza. After very troubled times in the 1540s (the disputes
between the first duke Pier Luigi Farnese, Charles V, and the governor of Milan, Ferrante
Gonzaga cannot be examined in detail  here) and some tumultuous years in the early
1550s  (with  Duke  Ottavio  leaning  towards  Henry  II  of  France),  relations  improved
significantly in and after 1556, thanks to Charles’s abdication and the entente between
Ottavio and Philip II following the Treaty of Ghent.28 In abandoning the French side and
pragmatically accepting Spanish hegemony,29 Ottavio brought about a remarkable shift in
his international alliances, winning in exchange Philip’s precious support in his effort to
consolidate his still unsteady young state. The treaty included the restitution of Piacenza
and its territory to the Duke, although he had to accept a Spanish garrison in the city’s
fort as a guarantee of his loyalty to Madrid until 1585, when it was finally withdrawn as a
reward for Alessandro Farnese’s oustanding (and for him extremely expensive) service in
Flanders.30
6 The Treaty of Ghent influenced Alessandro’s life from boyhood, as he had been given as a
hostage to the Spanish court. His father’s good conduct and respect for the terms of the
treaty were thereby guaranteed. In Madrid the young Italian prince absorbed Spanish
moral  values  and  cultural  attitudes,  experienced  its  political  practices  and  acquired
military skills – in a word, he had been brought up just like a Spanish Habsburg, thus
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developing  a  life-style  and  a  Weltanschauung typical  of  that  world.  On  such  firm
foundations  an  outstanding  military  and  political  leader  was  founded,  and  a  crucial
geopolitical  liaison  with  the  duchy  of  Parma  and  Piacenza  had  been  tightened.  Not
surprisingly,  Alessandro was  to  prove  himself  to  be not  merely  one  of  those  Italian
princes inclined to a pragmatic alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs: in many respects, he
had become one of them, one of the happy few.31
7 Although their careers were marked by a lesser-degree of identification with the Spanish
Habsburg  pattern  and  system  of  power,  two  other  important  Italian  crown  princes
enjoyed an education in Madrid that was in many respects comparable to that afforded to
Farnese:  Emanuel  Philibert  of  Savoy and Francesco de  Medici.  Francesco,  the  son of
Cosimo, stayed at the court of Philip II  in 1561-2. He shared this distinction with his
brother Pietro, who served there a few years later.32 The logical next step in Francesco’s
career was to marry Jane of Austria. Later on Philip II, through his personal envoy, stood
as godfather to their  son:  propitiously,  the child was named Philip.  As an archduke,
Francesco would pursue a policy that was usually inclined towards Madrid’s wishes: he
was well-known for his spagnolismo.33
8 Emanuel Philibert’s elder brother, Ludovico, was sent to Madrid to be brought up in the
Spanish way – alla spagnola.  Ludovico was the heir to the duchy of Savoy and his loyalty
to  Madrid  was  deemed  to  be  of  prime  importance.34 When  Ludovico  died,  the  cadet
Emanuel Philibert took his place as the new crown prince.35 He spent a few years in Turin
and Nice,  during which time his  mother,  Beatrice  of  Portugal,  deeply  influenced his
education. As Charles V’s sister-in-law, she introduced a new Iberian style and concept of
power in the court of Savoy.36  Then, at the age of nearly seventeen, Emanuel Philibert
went to the court of his uncle-in-law Charles V. The young prince quickly fell under the
spell of the Emperor, but he also succeeded in gaining his uncle’s favour and respect; in
time he succeeded in placing himself on intimate terms with his cousin Philip; honours
and  offices  were  showered  upon  him;  he  acquainted  himself  with  military  life  and
leadership and experienced the day-to-day intricacies of courtly life. 
9 In short, he received the education necessary for a prince, one which gave him familiarity
with the many facets of statesmanship, from royal finances to diplomacy.37 His career in
the  Emperor’s  service  reached  its  zenith  in  1553  when  Charles  V  appointed  him
commander-in-chief of the Army of Flanders. Charles’s abdication a few years later did
not  damage  Emanuel  Philibert’s  prospects,  and  the  new  king  soon  appointed  him
governor of Flanders. Philip’s faith in his Italian cousin was well-placed, as the victory at
St Quentin demonstrated. In turn the Catholic King assisted Emanuel Philibert to regain
the Duchy of Savoy.38
10 It has to be admitted that no strictly-deterministic nexus can be established between
Emanuel Philibert’s experience as a boy and a young man and his subsequent conduct as a
duke: the ruler of a strategically-crucial state, seeking a certain degree of neutrality and
latitude between Madrid and Paris,  certainly he was no puppet in Philip’s hands,  yet
neither did Habsburg rulers in Madrid and Milan always comply with the duke’s requests
or support his ambitions.39 Nevertheless, the first stages of his private and public life were
spent  predominantly  in  a  Habsburg  milieu,  and this  formative  period  clearly  deeply
influenced his later actions in both foreign and domestic affairs.40 A revealing indication of
the  importance  attached  by  the  Habsburgs  to  a  suitable  upbringing  lies  in  the
considerable pressure exerted by Philip II on Emanuel Philibert after 1571 in order that
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the heir  to the throne,  Charles Emanuel,  should be brought up cattolicamente (in the
Catholic  way),  if  possible  in  Spain.  The inference was  that  this  measure alone could
prevent any possible pernicious religious and political influence being brought to bear on
the duke in his tender years. In fact, the prince – who in 1585 married Philip’s younger
daughter Catalina Micaela41 – was raised and educated in the duchy; however, plans for his
schooling were changed quite considerably by Philip II’s insistence that he be taught
cattolicamente, and all his original tutors were substituted.42 Subsequently Charles Emanuel
would turn out to be a more pro-Habsburg ruler than his father.43
11 For  the Spanish Habsburgs,  co-optation was  not  only  an irreplaceable  instrument  to
create  consensus.  It  also  had  a  second,  vital  function:  that  of  providing  human,
professional, and economic resources, indispensable to the wider strategic efforts of the
monarchy.44 Together with taxation, co-optation was one of the most important means
through which non-Iberian components (as well as some non-Habsburg areas) could be
induced to make their  essential  contribution to the running of  the Spanish Empire.45
Several  Lombard  and  Italian  magnates  were  able  to  finance  (and  sometimes
simultaneously to lead) the tremendously expensive imperial campaigns; many others
held political, diplomatic, technical, and administrative offices of all ranks.46 
12 Moreover,  the  Italian  peninsula  was  particularly  rich  in  ‘skilful,  experienced,  and
authoritative soldiers’, and these men were appointed to all manner of positions within the
military-administrative system: they commanded regiments and fortresses, oversaw the
levying of soldiers and the construction of defensive works, and performed an array of
bureaucratic functions in the army or fleet.  In addition,  they were frequently put in
charge of covert operations.47 Suffice to mention Gabrio Serbelloni,48 Giovanni Anguissola,49 
Ambrogio Landriano,50 Bernabò Barbo, 51 Pirro Malvezzi, 52 Edoardo Lanzavecchia,53 Ottavio
Farnese,54 Sigismondo55 and Ottavio Gonzaga56 – all men whose distinguished careers were
spent  in  the  service  of  the  Spanish  Habsburgs.  How  important,  ubiquitous,  and
continuous was the service of Italian magnates can be easily deduced from the rolls of the
military units fighting for the Monarquía all over Europe during the last decades of the
sixteenth century.57
Sticks, carrots, and soft power: reflections on Spanish strategy and the State of Milan
13 The study of sixteenth-century Lombardy clearly demonstrates that strategy concerns
peace  (and ‘non-war’)  as  much as  open war.  It  also  corroborates  the  argument  that
Spanish pre-eminence in  Europe and the Mediterranean in the Cinquecento was  not
merely  or  simply  a  matter  of  soldiers,  weapons,  and  ships58 –  in  other  words,  a
demonstration of hard power. As we have seen, soft power was of profound importance in
shaping Spanish actions. Furthermore, even in those instances in which hard power was
deployed in an emphatic way, this branch of Madrid’s strategy was as much concerned
with (political and economic) carrots as with (military) sticks.59 In northern and central
Italy a wide range of strategic methods and tools were employed; the needs and demands
of a variety of  strategic actors (who were often anything but submissive to Madrid’s
demands) had to be taken into consideration.60 Needless to say, none of these actors could
compete with the Spanish superpower as an equal, but they all played the Italian strategic
game, and indeed some of them were major players. As a former Genoese doge wrote in
his journal in 1615, ‘li Spagnuoli … si sono avveduti … che un solo Principe d’Italia basta a
tenerli il bacile alla barba’ (the Spaniards have realized that even a single Italian prince
can be enough to bring about serious problems to them).61
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14 Spanish  Grand  Strategy  was  therefore  extremely  sophisticated.  Although  it  most
definitely was not a flawless instrument of power,62 it nevertheless skillfully – though not
always successfully – balanced the use of violence (or the threat to resort to it,  as a
deterrent) with the exertion of economic and financial pressures upon key points, as well
as with ideological propaganda, extensive patronage networks, innumerable diplomatic
initiatives,  far-reaching  intelligence  systems,  and  one-off  incentives  offered  to
individuals, families, and groups.63 This was a cocktail intended to foster consensus in the
Spanish  dominions,  and  thus  to  enhance  the  mobilization  and  management  of  the
crown’s multiple resources, to collect information about and (whenever possible) hinder
French  and  Ottoman  strategic  plans,  to  expand  the  Spanish  zone  of  influence  by
attracting new allies and aderenti (minor potentates, federated with or recommended to
major polities),64 to prevent key strategic actors from falling under the influence of Paris.65
15 In  the  international  theatre,  political  and  strategic  relations  usually  do  not  merely
reproduce  proportionally  the  existing  dimensions  of  military  force.  Not  surprisingly,
therefore, Madrid could not solve all  its strategic problems by the employment of its
tercios and galleys.  In this it  was no different to twentieth- and twenty-first-century
Great Powers, who similarly found (and continue to find) that in many circumstances
they  cannot  deploy  their  full  military  potential.  To  keep  the  status  quo  in  such  an
intricate area as northern Italy was no easy task for the Habsburg rulers in Milan and
Madrid.  They substantially succeeded in maintaining and even strengthening Spanish
pre-eminence,66 but this achievement was the fruit of unending labour. The one constant
in this Habsburg system was that new challenges would arise to it. Formidable as it was,
Spanish  hegemony  in  Italy  was  never  established  once  and  for  all;  it  needed  to  be
patiently protected, re-established, maintained, and shored-up on a day-by-day basis. The
Pax Hispanica in the peninsula could by no means be taken for granted: on the contrary,
it was the outcome of a most complex process, the result of numerous competing – and
unremitting – agencies, methods, and relations.67
16 The strategic influence exerted by the Spanish superpower over the Italian peninsula was
doubtless largely based on its overwhelming military force,68 both actual and potential.
Moreover,  every  so  often  individual  statesmen  or  lobbies  proposed,  supported,  or
implemented hawkish approaches to Italian and Mediterranean affairs.69 Was it better to
continue  the  old  policy  of  management,  or  to  attempt  to  redraw  the  map  through
military force and heavy political pressure? This was the question that on some occasions
kept Charles V and Philip II on the horns of a crucial strategic dilemma. The fact remains,
however, that in most cases Spanish Habsburg rulers tended to stick to the traditional
strategy  of  maintaining  paz  y  quietud  in  the  peninsula.  The  more  cautious  voices
frequently  prevailed.70 In  all  likelihood,  the  unsuccessful  invasion  of  Finale  in  1571
strengthened this tendency.71 
17 The chimera of an even tighter domination of the peninsula competed with the reality of
constant  balances  and  checks  to  Spain’s  power  in  sixteenth-century  Italy.  Thus,  the
recourse to a diversified strategy, one based predominantly upon carrots and soft power
and in which military hard power – the stick - served usually as a means of deterrence
rather than as a form of chastisement or outright conquest, turned out to be the best one
for  Madrid  in  a  great  number  of  Italian  affairs.  Philip’s  II  unquestionable  military
superiority in the peninsula ensured that strategic restraint,72 measured in efforts to build
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up consensus,  often proved more  profitable  to  Spanish Grand Strategy  than did  the
blatant flexing of muscles.73
NOTES
1. - Elliott, ‘A Europe’, 56-7, 64, 69. See also F. Benigno, L’ombra del re. Ministri e lotta politica
nella Spagna del Seicento (Venezia, 1992), 37; and Spagnoletti, Prìncipi, 32-4.
2. - As a matter of fact, the beneficed ‘partecipando quasi di tal Imperio si sforzano poi a
mantenerlo sotto gli auspizi del Re loro’, since ‘chi mangia in casa tua serve a te’
(Campanella, Della Monarchia, 127 and 128). See also Spagnoletti, Prìncipi, 8-11, 17-25, 40-3;
Fasano Guarini, ‘Italia’, 9-10;  Costantini, La Repubblica,  145, 148, 218, 236, 237-8, 243;
Chavarría Múgica, ‘“Filípoli, Filípica o Filipiana”’, 204; Merlin, Tra guerre, 99 and 101; G.
Signorotto, Milano spagnola. Guerra, istituzioni, uomini di governo (1635-1660) (Firenze, 1996),
171-203.
3. - Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 734-5.
4. - BNM, ms. 1008, fo. 254v.
5. - Savelli, ‘“Honore et robba”’, 23. Interestingly, the sons of Agostino Landi stayed at the
Spanish court (Podestà, Dal delitto, 196). On Francesco Maria Della Rovere, see Spagnoletti,
Le dinastie, 313.
6. - ASM, RCS, reg. 14, fos. 76v-7 and 79v-80, reg. 15, fo. 20, reg. 16, fo. 117-v; AGS, SP, 1156,
fo. 111-v, 1157, fo. 370v; AGS, E, 1215 (222, 229, 230), 1216 (71), 1245 (3 and 145); 
Infformaçiones y recuerdos. M. Rivero Rodríguez, ‘Poder y clientelas en la fundación del
Consejo de Italia (1556-1560)’, Cheiron, 17-18 (1992), 33; Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 736-7 and 739-40;
idem, ‘Poteri’; Savelli, ‘“Honore et robba”’, 24 and 34; Fasano Guarini, ‘Italia’, 16; Parker, 
The Grand Strategy, 80-1; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 42-4, 126-7, 201, 207-8, 229; idem, Prìncipi,
9, 19-20, 28, 43-4, 47-50, 51-63, 80-4, 157-62; Merlin, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 184 and 190-1.
7. - AGS, SP, 1157, fos. 280v-3; ASM, RCS, reg. 21, fos. 166v-7. F. Arese, ‘Le supreme cariche
del Ducato di Milano’, Archivio storico lombardo, XCVII (1970), 84; Merlin, Tra guerre, 10 and
97; idem, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 191.
8. - AGS, SP, 1157, fos. 332-3, 376v-7, 393-v. Arese, ‘Le supreme cariche’, 84; and Rizzo,
‘Milano’, 740.
9. - Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 740.
10. - AGS, SP, 1157, fos. 370v and 442v-3v; ASM, RCS, reg. 14, fo. 142v, reg. 20, fos. 67v-8.
Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 737.
11. - Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 743.
12. - Ibid., 743.
13. - Ibid., 737.
14. - Ibid., 743.
15. - ASM, RCS, reg. 21, fos. 251-2 and 270-v. Merlin, Tra guerre, 95, 96, 97, 99-101, 104-6,
122; idem, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 183, 184, 191, 197; Savelli, ‘“Honore et robba”’, 21.
16. - Merlin, Tra guerre, 98 and 101-2; and idem, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 192-3.
Sticks, Carrots and all the Rest: Lombardy and the Spanish strategy in Northe...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 71 | 2005
6
17. - AGS, SP, 1157, fos. 252-v and 395-v; ASM, RCS, reg. 16, fo. 136. R. Tamalio,
‘Vespasiano Gonzaga al servizio del re di Spagna in Spagna’, in Bazzotti, Ferrari,
Mozzarelli, eds., Vespasiano Gonzaga, 121-51; C. Mozzarelli, ‘Lo stato gonzaghesco. Mantova
dal 1328 al 1707’, in Marini, Tocci, Mozzarelli, Stella, I Ducati, 441-3; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie
, 203-4 and 244; idem, Prìncipi, 27-8, 39-40, 54; Parker, The Grand Strategy, 82; Rivero
Rodríguez, ‘Poder’, 33.
18. - For example, Monsù d’Ormea (a feudal lord of the Langhe, in the duchy of Savoy,
receiving a pension from the king of France) and Filiberto Del Carretto (afeudal lord in
Liguria and in the State of Milan) sent their firstborns to Paris, ‘ove erano molto honorat
{i} et stipendiat{i}’ (Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 738-9). See also Merlin, Tra guerre, 95-6; Spagnoletti, Le
dinastie, 126, 202, 229, 330-1; idem, Prìncipi, 35 and 62-3; Rivero Rodríguez, ‘Felipe II’,
337-40.
19. - Parker, The Grand Strategy, 82; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 236 n. 46, 242-3, 312; idem, 
Prìncipi, 44; Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 41 and 62-77.
20. - ASM, RCS, reg. 14, fo. 187-v. Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 42 and 236; idem, Prìncipi, 24-5
and 44; Merlin, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 55, 56, 57; Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 737; idem, ‘“A forza di denari”’,
291.
21. - Parker, The Grand Strategy, 83; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 65, 120, 207, 236 n. 46, 312, 332;
idem, Prìncipi, 24-5, 45, 51-104; Savelli, ‘“Honore et robba”’, 34.
22. - Cano de Gardoqui, ‘España’, 525-6; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 65; idem, Prìncipi, 20, 25,
35, 43-4, 45-6; Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 18-9 and 32.
23. - Parker, The Grand Strategy, 83.
24. - Spagnoletti, Principi, 31-2; idem, Le dinastie, 27, 33, 119-20, 134, 136-7, 161, 166-8, 171,
209-22; Fasano Guarini, ‘Italia’, 9-10; Parker, The Grand Strategy, 82; Diaz, Il Granducato, 72,
119, 166, 185, 233; Cano de Gardoqui, ‘España’, 554; Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 6; idem, ‘Il
Cinquecento’, 185.
25. - Parker, The Grand Strategy, 82 and 83.
26. - For instance, when archduke Ferdinando I of Florence in 1587 succeeded his brother
Francesco de Medici as Grand Duke of Tuscany, he distanced himself from Madrid and
implemented a policy that brought him closer to the orbit of Paris.  In order to restrain
him, the Habsburgs employed his brother, don Pietro, who served in the court of Philip II
and was very hostile to Ferdinando (Diaz, Il Granducato, 233, 238, 278, 280, 286, 289, 290;
and Fasano Guarini, ‘Italia’, 16, 17, 18). See also Cano de Gardoqui, ‘España’, 545-6;
Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 229-31 and 236; idem, Prìncipi, 25 n. 71.
27. - According to Campanella, ‘si deve procurare che tutti i … figli {dei Baroni} abbino
maestri Spagnuoli per spagnolarli, mutando li abiti, costumi e modi di Spagna’ (Della
Monarchia, 128; see also 130).  Campanella also wrote: ‘O manca la Monarchia per esser
troppo grande che non si può reggere da uno, onde si fa compagni che si dicono Conti, i
quali poi sogliono da sé vivere; e dividono l’imperio, come avvenne al Romano. Rimedio è
di contenere l’imperio fra certi limiti, … ovvero tenere appresso a sé i figli e mogli de’
baroni e Governanti e delli Capitani di Guerra, e stringerli con giuramento come usa
Spagna, e visitarli per via de’ Religiosi’ (Aforismi politici, in Opere di Tommaso Campanella, II,
33). See also Parker, The Grand Strategy, 82-3; and Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 236, 282, 310-2,
314.
28. - Tocci, ‘Il ducato’, 235, 237, 238. For Pier Luigi, see also Podestà, Dal delitto; 21-173; and
Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 30.
29. - Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 31-2. See also Tocci, Le terre, 37; and Rizzo, ‘“A forza di
denari”’, 300.
Sticks, Carrots and all the Rest: Lombardy and the Spanish strategy in Northe...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 71 | 2005
7
30. - Tocci, ‘Il ducato’, 238 and 248. See also G. Botero, Della ragion di  stato (Roma, 1997),
215 and 218; M. A. Romani, ‘Finanza pubblica e potere politico: il caso dei Farnese
(1545-93)’, in idem, ed., Le corti farnesiane di Parma e Piacenza (Rome, 1978), I, 27 and 38-9;
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 82 and 327 n. 23; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 301. On other Farneses
and Farnese’s subjects serving in Flanders, see Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 742-3. On the
expensiveness of such top positions, for Gian Andrea Doria see Savelli, ‘“Honore et
robba”’, 15 and 16-7.
31. - Tocci, ‘Il ducato’, 248. It is worth remembering that Alessandro had married Mary of
Portugal (Tocci, ‘Il ducato’, 238). See also Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 44; Parker, The Grand
Strategy, 83; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 242-3.
32. - Diaz, Il Granducato, 239. In 1605 Philip III sent don Pietro’s sons to the court of their
uncle Ferdinando.  This embassy was designed to reconcile Florence with Madrid after
years of tensions and disagreements (ibid., 290). See also Cano de Gardoqui, ‘España’,
553-4; and Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 230-1, 236, 313-4.
33. - Diaz, Il Granducato, 185, 231, 232-3, 234, 235, 236-8, 241, 274, 292, 295; Spagnoletti, Le
dinastie, 167-8, 170, 172, 182-3, 227, 230-1, 312-3; idem, Prìncipi, 54.
34. - Merlin, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 53.
35. - Ibid., 53-4.
36. - Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 6-7.
37. - Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 16-40, 47-8, 50, 58, 62, 171; and idem, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 54-6.
38. - Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 41-77; and idem, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 56-7.
39. - Fasano Guarini, ‘Italia’, 15-6; and Merlin, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 72, 73, 74, 79-80, 81-3,
140-5.
40. - Merlin, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 61-2, 70, 72, 73, 84, 168.
41. - Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 163 and 164-5; and Parker, The Grand Strategy, 82.
42. - Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 198.
43. - Merlin, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 182-93; idem, Tra guerre, 97-106; Fasano Guarini, ‘Italia’, 16
and 17; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 38-41; Spagnoletti, Prìncipi, 54.
44.  - ‘Per mantenere un tanto regno, ha bisogno il Re di grandi uomini in lettere ed armi,
a’ quali poi per rimunerazione doni qualche signoria Baroniale … Dunque veda il Re in che
nuocono e in che giovano i Baroni; e gli deve tenere più presto come suoi Tesorieri d’armi
e di danari, che come padroni di Stati; e però fra questi tesorieri sciegliere i capitani
ancora, facendo mettere i secondogeniti ne’ Seminarj della virtù militare per mare e per
terra, … e s’accattiverà i Baroni per mezzo de’ figlioli, e se ne servirà nelli bisogni’
(Campanella, Della Monarchia, 127 e 130).
45. - H. Kamen, Imperio. La forja de España como potencia mundial (Madrid, 2003), 17; 
Williams, ‘Past’, 275; Spagnoletti, Prìncipi, xiv and 33-5.
46. - Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 242-3; and Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 44.
47. - ASM, RCS, reg. 20, fo. 342; Relacion de lo que montara el sueldo de un año de quatrocientos
y noventa cavallos ligeros…, in AGS, SP, 1154; AGS, SP, 1154, fo. 23. Spagnoletti, Le dinastie,
42, 44-5, 205, 238-9; idem, Prìncipi, 20, 36, 43; Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 735-6 and 740-2; idem, ‘“A
forza di denari”’, 287-8 and 290-1.
48. - AGS, SP, 1157, fos. 235v-42; ASM, RCS, reg. 12, fo. 125v, reg. 14, fos. 158v-9v, reg. 17,
fo. 167-v. Arese, ‘Le supreme cariche’, 84; L. Besozzi, ‘Gabrio Serbelloni nei documenti alla
Trivulziana (1527-1566)’, Libri & Documenti, X (1984), 14-43; idem, ‘Uomini d’arme
verbanesi alla difesa di Tunisi nel 1574’, Verbanus, 7 (1986), 135-83; J. Akacha and M.
Garulli, ‘Architetti e ingegneri militari italiani al presidio della Goletta di Tunisi
Sticks, Carrots and all the Rest: Lombardy and the Spanish strategy in Northe...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 71 | 2005
8
(1535-1574)’, in M. Viganò, ed., Architetti e ingegneri militari italiani all’estero dal XV al XVIII
secolo (Milano, 1994), 87, 88, 93-5; Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 740 and 743; idem, ‘Competizione’, 382
n. 26.
49. - AGS, E, 1219 (165), 1244 (2); AGS, SP, 1156, fos. 39-42v and 141; ASM, RCS, reg. 12, fos.
74, 270, 257v, reg. 14, fos. 42, 141v-2, 151v, reg. 15, fo. 85v; Infformaçiones y recuerdos. Arese,
‘Le supreme cariche’, 84; Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 740; idem, ‘“A forza di denari”’, 287.
50. - ASM, RCS, reg. 23, fos. 143-4. Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 740 and 743.
51. - Merlin, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 190 n. 5; and Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 742 and 743.
52. - ASM, RCS, reg. 23, fos. 27-v and 96v-8, reg. 30, fos. 68v-9. Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 740; idem,
‘“A forza di denari”’, 289-90 and 291; Spagnoletti, Prìncipi, 158-9; Cano de Gardoqui,
‘España’, 540. Truth to tell, in 1601 Francesco Martinengo, a powerful Brescian noble and
officer who had served both Venice and Savoy, suggested to Venetian rulers ‘di contattare
a Milano Pietro Malvezzi, membro del consiglio segreto e di guerra ma “povero
cavaliero”, disposto per denaro a svelare segreti’. Then, ‘nel marzo 1601 il capitano di
Brescia offre tremila scudi’ to Malvezzi (Preto, I servizi, 213 and 462).  Did Malvezzi really
disclose secrets to Venice? How deep was his alleged treason? Did Spanish rulers in Milan
expose it? Was Malvezzi double-crossing Martinengo? Actually, we do not know yet.
 However, the fact remains that the Malvezzis remained close to the Spanish government
in the decades to come (Rizzo, ‘“A forza di denari”’, 289-90).
53. - ASM, RCS, reg. 23, fo. 27. Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 738-9, 743, 763.
54. - Merlin, Emanuele Filiberto, 44.
55. - ASM, RCS, reg. 15, fos. 14 and 97v, reg. 16, fo. 83v, reg. 20, fos. 319 and 342. Rizzo,
‘Milano’, 740; idem, ‘“A forza di denari”’, 287, 290, 317.
56. - ASM, RCS, reg. 21, fos. 293-4 and 303v-4, reg. 34, fo. 21-v. Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 740 and 743.
57. - Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 742-3. See also Spagnoletti, Prìncipi, 182-3.
58. - For similar considerations about the American strategic approach,  see Qiao Liang
and Wang Xiangsui, Guerra, 159.
59. - Discussing the best way to control Italian potentates, Campanella maintains that
‘stando le cose come oggi stanno deve sforzarsi il Re di tenerli disuniti servendosi di
Parma o d’altri, … Ma se il Re ha caro di fare che si disunischino, non faccia paura a loro,
poiché la paura di Spagna mantiene l’Italia unita; però bisogna mostrar poca voglia contro
di loro. Con la religione, né si devono né possono disunire, ma con beneficj’ (Della
Monarchia, 170-1).
60. - See, for examples, AGS, E, 1224 (59-69, 99, 112, 117), 1245 (140-1 and 143), 1272 (120).
Fasano Guarini, ‘Italia’, 14, 16, 17; Rizzo, ‘“A forza di denari”’, 293-5; Williams, ‘Past’,
244-5; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 48; idem, Prìncipi, 47; Raggio, Faide, 157 and 159-74.
61. - The passage is taken from Alessandro Giustiniani’s Giornale dei suoi tempi, quoted in
Costantini, La Repubblica, 242.
62. - Parker, The Grand Strategy, 281-96.
63. - Ibid., 82; Angiolini, ‘Diplomazia’, 452; Chavarría Múgica, ‘“Filípoli, Filípica o Filipiana”’,
204-5, 225, 226; Williams, ‘Past’, 245; García García, La Pax, 75-6 and 80; Cano de Gardoqui,
‘España’, 546; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 127; idem, Prìncipi, 10-1, 21, 32, 46, 59, 140-3.
64. - On the importance of this issue see, for example, G. Parker, ‘Guerra e rivoluzione
militare (1450-1789)’, in M. Aymard, ed., Storia d’Europa (Turin, 1995), IV, 470, quoting the
words written in 1619 by an experienced Spanish ambassador, the count of Gondomar, to
Philip III: ‘oggi le guerre non si limitano a una pura prova di forza, né si esauriscono nelle
battaglie campali. Il loro esito dipende piuttosto dal fatto che si perdano o si conquistino
Sticks, Carrots and all the Rest: Lombardy and the Spanish strategy in Northe...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 71 | 2005
9
amici e alleati’. See also Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 128; and idem, Prìncipi, 12 and 59. For the
specific meaning of the word ‘aderente’, see G. Rezasco, Dizionario del linguaggio italiano
storico ed amministrativo (Florence, 1881), 14.
65. - Rizzo, ‘Milano’, 738; idem, ‘Poteri’; Cano de Gardoqui, ‘España’, 531-2; García García, 
La Pax, 76; Spagnoletti, Prìncipi, 25 and n. 71.
66. - Cano de Gardoqui, ‘España’, 554-5; and Spagnoletti, Prìncipi, 1-9 and 28.
67. - AGS, E, 1270 (162). García García, La Pax, 74-81; Angiolini, ‘Diplomazia’, 433-5, 451-3,
467-8; Pacini, La Genova, 18-9; Fasano Guarini, ‘Italia’, 12, 14-5, 18-9; Cano de Gardoqui,
‘España’, 531; Parker, The Grand Strategy, 83; Chavarría Múgica, ‘“Filípoli, Filípica o Filipiana
”’, 204, 205, 215-8; Spagnoletti, Le dinastie, 23 and 37-8; idem, Prìncipi, 7, 24, 35; Rizzo,
‘Poteri’.
68. - Rizzo, ‘‘Rivoluzione’; idem, ‘Non solo guerra’; García García, La Pax, 76.
69. - It is instructive that, despite the deep personal rivalries between the men, Ferrante
Gonzaga, the duke of Alba, and Diego Hurtado de Mendoza proposed very similar and
wide-ranging plans for a tighter Habsburg hegemony in Italy: see F. Chabod, Storia di
Milano nell’epoca di Carlo V (Torino, 1961), 127-39, 179-227, 230-1; Rivero Rodríguez, Felipe II
, 44-8; G. Biasco, ‘La strategia politico-militare di Ferrante Gonzaga: la difesa del
predominio spagnolo’, to appear in Guerra y sociedad. In his ‘Advertencias sobre los
presidios de Toscana’, written in 1568 for Philip II, the former ‘auditor general’ of the
‘Stato dei Presidi’, Francisco Álvarez de Ribeira (who previously had served in the military
in Italy and later would have a successful and prestigious executive career in Naples,
culminating in his appointment as member of the Council in Italy) championed a more
aggressive approach to Italian affairs: see Chavarría Múgica, ‘“Filípoli, Filípica o Filipiana”’,
207-8 and 226. In 1574 the governor of Milan, marquis of Ayamonte, suggested to Philip II
that this was an opportune moment to take advantage of French weakness and seize the
marquisate of Saluzzo in Piedmont, as well as Toulon, Marseilles, and other places in
France: see Rizzo, ‘“A forza di denari”’, 298; and Parker, The Grand Strategy, 8. On
Ayamonte’s approach to Italian affairs see also AGS, E, 1239 (69), 1245 (136-7 and 146),
1246 (110 and 130). In 1583 the governor of Milan, duke of Terranova, invited the king to
be ready to seize some territories in Piedmont in the event of the death of the seriously ill
duke of Savoy.  Some of Terranova’s counsellors in Milan had warmly supported an even
more aggressive approach, one also advocated by the duke of Parma: see Rizzo, ‘“A forza
di denari”’, 299-300. In 1588 Philip finally approved the occupation of Saluzzo by his son-
in-law Charles Emanuel of Savoy, upon learning that Henry III of France had murdered
the duke of Guise (at first Philip, taken by surprise, had ordered Charles Emanuel to
withdraw, fearing his attack could jeopardize the status quo in Italy): see Parker, The Grand
Strategy, 83; and J. L. Cano de Gardoqui, La cuestion de Saluzzo (Valladolid, 1962), passim. In
the light of Ferdinando de Medici’s apparent opposition to Spain and Spanish interests, ‘A
finalizar el siglo XVI se barajó incluso un plan de conquista y reparto del Gran Ducado de
Toscana que finalmente no fue necesario llevar a cabo’ (Chavarría Múgica, ‘“Filípoli,
Filípica o Filipiana”’, 229 n. 95); for details, see Cano de Gardoqui, ‘España’, 545-52. For
Fuentes’s aggressive approach to Italian issues, see note 172 of this paper. Interestingly,
‘It is probably true that the decade prior to 1610 had witnessed a more determined and
sustained programme of Spanish {naval} aggression’ in the Mediterranean’ (Williams,
‘Past’, 269-70).
70. - AGS, E, 1278 (53). Chavarría Múgica, ‘“Filípoli, Filípica o Filipiana”’, 226; Cano de
Gardoqui, ‘España’, 552-4; García García, La Pax, 77 and 81; Merlin, ‘Il Cinquecento’, 185-90;
Spagnoletti, Prìncipi, 8.
Sticks, Carrots and all the Rest: Lombardy and the Spanish strategy in Northe...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 71 | 2005
10
71. - Parker, The Grand Strategy, 84-5.
72. - For the concept of strategic restraint, see Kupchan, La fine, 312 and 314. See also
García García, La Pax, 185-203; and Cano de Gardoqui, ‘España’, 548 and 549.
73. - Chavarría Múgica, ‘“Filípoli, Filípica o Filipiana”’, 209-10.
RÉSUMÉS
Cette  communication a  pour but  d’étudier  la  stratégie  espagnole dans la  Lombardie  du XVI°
siècle, en replaçant les développements politiques, sociaux et militaires dans le cadre de l’Italie
du Nord, au sein d’une Europe plus large et inscrits dans le tissu méditerranéen.
This  paper  adopts  a  comprehensive  approach  to  Spanish  strategy  in  sixteenth-century
Lombardy, one which places political, social, economic, and military developments in northern
Italy within a wider European and Mediterranean framework.
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